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University of Notre Dame, 
Indiana, 1987
E x c e r p t  f r o m  C h a p t e r  4
RIOTS ON DIVISION S T R H T
...During the summer
of 1966 the city of Chicago 
became the site of the first 
major urban Puerto Rican riot 
in the history of the United 
States. The outburst was one in 
a series of urban protest riots 
which raged in American soci­
ety, primarily among blacks, 
from the end of World War II 
until the last years of the 
1960s. Puerto Rican behavior 
in Chicago during the summer 
of 1966 mirrored the dilemma 
of exploited, non-white people 
in the United States: whether 
to withstand the rejection of 
the majority in the hope that 
ameliorative action would bring 
rewards within the system or 
to lash out and destroy the 
“hated environment”, thus 
abruptly focusing the attention 
of the majority and bringing 
release for oneself.
Division Street Riot, June 13-16, 1966 
Courtesy of Chicago Sun-Times
i
Police Commander James C. Holzman (pointing) issues orders after 
taking over new duties in Division Street hot spot area. June 15, 1966
The Puerto Rican riot occurred almost at the same time that var­ious national and local govern­
mental agencies were taking precau­
tionary measures to head off rioting 
in major American cities. The two 
preceding years had witnessed some 
of the largest and most intense black 
disturbances ever—Harlem, Watts, 
Detroit, Philadelphia, etc. In order to 
prevent future outbursts, the Justice 
Department instructed its Assistant 
United States Attorneys to report on 
conditions in a score of communities 
considered particularly “inflamma­
ble”. The Vice President’s Task 
Force on Youth Opportunity autho­
rized its field representatives to 
investigate potential trouble spots 
and offer short-term recommenda­
tions. These findings were to be 
made available to federal agencies 
involved in the black ghettos. 
Government officials throughout the 
country devised emergency pro­
grams to employ and entertain black 
youths and otherwise keep them off 
the streets, while local and state 
police departments aided by the 
F.B.I. prepared coordinated riot-con­
trol plans. (These measures were 
not designed to alleviate conditions 
in the ghettos but merely to prevent 
their manifestation ever—Harlem). 
Hence, it was with mounting appre­
hension that local and federal offi­
cials awaited the summer.
They did not have to wait long. 
The Puerto Rican riot erupted in 
June, and was followed by distur­
bances among blacks in battered 
cities previously stricken and cities 
hitherto spared, Omaha, Dayton, San 
Francisco, and Atlanta. The summer 
of 1966 was the most violent yet.
The Puerto Rican riot began June 
12, 1966 when a white policeman 
shot and wounded a young Puerto 
Rican man, Arcelis Cruz, twenty 
years old, near the intersection of 
Division Street and Damen Avenue in 
the Westtown community. After the 
shooting, the situation at the 
Division-Damen intersection intensi­
fied when the police brought dogs 
into the fray and a Puerto Rican was 
bitten. For three days and nights, a 
Puerto Rican crowd demonstrated 
against police brutality. And each 
time the police tried to disperse the 
crowd, it only succeeded in arousing 
them.
From June 12 to June 14, Puerto 
Ricans not only defied the police, but 
also looted and burned neighbor­
hood businesses, particularly those 
identified as white-owned. The city’s 
Puerto Rican leaders pleaded with 
the rioters to return to their homes,
but to little avail. The Chicago Sun- 
Times (June 14, 1966:1) reports that 
at one rally, organized during the sec­
ond day of the riot and held at the 
intersection of Division Street and 
California Avenue, community orga­
nization leaders and clergymen 
urged the crowd of 3,000 to halt the 
violence. Immediately after the rally, 
however, rocks and bricks were 
thrown at policemen. Meanwhile the 
police department ordered all avail­
able personnel into the Division 
Street area to quell the rioting, 
and on June 15, order was finally 
restored. By this time, it was official­
ly acknowledged that 16 persons 
were injured, 49 were arrested, over 
50 buildings were destroyed, and mil­
lions of dollars accrued in damages.
...The state of police-Puerto Rican 
relations before the riot was a major 
source of Puerto Rican frustration 
and accounts for the presence of a 
generalized belief which, following 
Smelser’s approach, became the nec­
essary ingredient in producing this 
collective action. For many years 
Puerto Ricans attempted, without any 
success, to bring to light the ample 
evidence of discriminatory beatings 
and humiliations, as in the case of 
Gonzalez-Burgos described in the 
preceding chapter. The numerous 
hostile and abrasive encounters 
between the police and barrio resi­
dents, particularly those incidents 
perceived by the Puerto Rican com­
munity as inflammatory and as acts 
of injustice or insults to the Puerto 
Rican community, were the trigger­
ing events of the 1966 riot. As psy­
chologist Leonard Berkowitz points 
out in his discussion of civil violence 
among blacks: “[The police] are the 
‘head thumpers’, the all too-often hos­
tile enforcers of laws arbitrarily 
imposed upon [blacks] by an alien 
world” (1968:48).
The society’s bases of legitimacy 
and authority had been attacked. 
Law and order had long been 
viewed by Puerto Ricans as the white 
man’s law and order, but now 
this characteristic perspective of a
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Puerto Rican residents of the Division Street area 
shared a pervasive belief that policemen were 
physically brutal, harsh, and discourteous to 
them because they were Puerto Ricans.. .
colonized people was out in the 
open. Puerto Rican residents of the 
Division Street Area shared a perva­
sive belief that policemen were phys­
ically brutal, harsh, and discourte­
ous to them because they were 
Puerto Ricans; that policemen did 
not respond to calls, enforce the law, 
or protect people who lived in this 
community because they were 
Puerto Ricans. Their grievances 
about police brutality and inadequa­
cy of protection yielded the deep 
sense of hostility and resentment 
prevalent among other ethnic minor­
ity groups in urban America.
...The testimonies of fifty-four wit­
nesses at a public hearing held a 
month following the Division Street 
Riot (Friday and Saturday, July 15 
and 16, 1966) provide further evi­
dence of the negative appraisals of 
police behavior by barrio residents. 
According to the summary report of 
the hearings entitled “The Puerto 
Rican Residents of Chicago, a Report 
on an Open Hearing,” of six major 
problem areas identified by the wit­
nesses, relations between Puerto 
Rican residents and the police was 
the most pressing and in most need 
of corrective action. In fact, one wit­
ness expressed the point that since 
the state of Puerto Rican-police rela­
tions was so incredibly poor, “a com­
prehensive community action pro­
gram against social injustice” needed 
to be established in the community.
Yet the police became a main 
focal point for attack not only 
because of their attitude and behav­
ior toward Puerto Ricans, but
because they symbolized the 
despised invisible white power struc­
ture. Of the institutional contacts 
with which barrio residents had inti­
mate contact schools, social welfare 
and employment agencies, medical 
facilities, and business owners the 
police embodied the most crushing 
authority. For many Puerto Ricans, 
the police had come to represent 
more than enforcement of law; they 
were viewed as members of an “occu­
pying army” and as an oppressive 
force acting on behalf of those who 
ruled their environment.
Some city officials and other crit­
ics of the riots used what social scien­
tists have called the “criminal riffraff’ 
theory of rioting in explaining the 
outburst (e.g., Fogelson and Hill, 
1968). According to this view, every 
large urban ghetto contains a dispro­
portionate number of criminals, 
delinquents, unemployed, school 
dropouts, and other social misfits 
who on the slightest pretext are 
ready to riot, loot, and exploit an 
explosive social situation for their pri­
vate gain and for satisfying their 
aggressive anti-social instincts. After 
meeting in City Hall with residents 
from the Division Street Area, Mayor 
Daley made a statement to the press 
appealing especially to the neighbor­
hood parents to keep their children 
off the streets. “Such action should 
be taken,” stressed the Mayor, “in 
areas where unthinking and irre­
sponsible individuals and gangs are 
seeking a climate of violence and 
uncertainty that threatens lives 
and property” (Chicago Sun-Times,
June 15, 1966).
Thus, according to city officials 
and others, the basic source of the 
trouble was not to be found among 
long-standing and well established 
residents of the Puerto Rican com­
munity, an otherwise tranquil and 
satisfied populace. Such a view 
contained important advantages for 
city officials who widely espoused it.
...Viewed from a different point, 
the Division Street Riot was the 
action of a people, poor and dispos­
sessed and crushed in large numbers 
in el barrio, who rose up in wrath 
against a society committed to demo­
cratic ideals. Their outburst was an 
expression of powerlessness resent­
ment against racial prejudice, anger 
at the unreachable affluence around 
them, and frustration at their 
sociopolitical powerlessness. Puerto 
Ricans had gradually developed an 
urban consciousness—a conscious­
ness of an entrapped ethnic minority. 
The sense of entrapment stemmed 
from the inability of the Puerto 
Ricans to break out of the urban 
ghetto and become part of the bur­
geoning middle class. There were 
conditions of deprivation in the 
Puerto Rican community that since 
the 1966 riot have come to be widely 
recognized as very real grievances. 
Frustration and alienation accentuat­
ed by feelings of relative deprivation 
must be regarded as psychological 
factors that create a readiness for 
individuals to give vent to what 
Smelser calls collective behavior.
It was during this time that some 
Puerto Ricans sensed the possibility 
of improvement; in fact, they had 
become quite dissatisfied with their 
situation and rebelled against it. And 
“with rebellion,” as Albert Camus 
(1967:247) puts it, “awareness is 
born,” and with awareness, an impa­
tience “which can extend to every­
thing that [people] had previously 
accepted, and which is almost always 
retroactive.” Puerto Ricans began to 
realize, perhaps for the first time in
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their lives, that the signs advertising 
“American egalitarianism” did not 
include them. Puerto Ricans found 
themselves on the outside looking 
in. Since coming to Chicago they 
had remained on the metaphoric 
margin, apart from, not a part of, the 
important positions of America’s 
institutional life they represented a 
population whose participation in the 
political and economic systems 
occurred at the lowest reaches of 
these structures. Thus, a population 
of Spanish-speaking people that used 
to see the proverbial glass as half full 
now saw it as half empty.
...Puerto Ricans began vowing to 
fight to change their conditions and 
their way to power. There was a dif­
ference in both the tone and the 
tempo of their protest: the tone was 
bitter and the tempo frenetic. There 
had been times when expressions of 
anger, hatred, and hostility had burst 
out in the Division Street Area in the 
form of small acts of aggression 
against representatives of the domi­
nant group or against other minority
group members. But it was the col­
lective support given this expressed 
hostility, permitting the spread and 
intensification of it in reckless defi­
ance of police power, that made the 
outburst an instance of collective 
behavior that was more than just 
another race riot.
In the Puerto Rican community a 
sense of betrayal of expectations 
brought about a focus on the griev­
ances of the past and present. The 
visibility of an affluent, comfortable, 
middle-class life made possible by a 
powerful mass communications sys­
tem was in itself enough to induce 
dual feelings of resentment and emu­
lation. The failure of society to effec­
tively raise the status of those 
trapped in el barrio contributed to the 
smoldering resentments. The urge to 
retaliate, to return the hurts and the 
injustices, played an integral part of 
the Division Street Riot. In short, the 
1966 riot erupted as a new generation 
of Puerto Ricans sensed that persua­
sion was not going to bring an end to 
subordination and oppression. They
saw that the Puerto Rican communi­
ty was far more powerless than the 
earlier successes of Los Caballeros 
might suggest. The Puerto Rican 
community took to the streets in defi­
ance of both the obdurate white com­
munity and the older Puerto Rican 
leadership who had tried to win the 
battle for equality without bloodshed. 
Tired of promises of things to come, 
bitterly frustrated by ghetto-living, 
and seething with a hatred born of 
denial, they sought action.
RISC OF A POLITICIZED 
ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS
The 1966 riot represents a major 
watershed in the history of Puerto 
Ricans in Chicago. For one thing, it 
demonstrated the depth of Puerto 
Rican discontent, the extent of 
Puerto Rican anger and hate, and the 
ease with which Puerto Rican anger 
and hate could flare into violence. 
More important, the riot raised the 
anger to a new pitch. When the 
police dogs were unleashed on the 
corner of Damen and Division Street, 
every Puerto Rican in the city felt 
their teeth in the marrow of his or 
her bones. The explosion of anger 
and hatred that resulted for a 
moment, at least, broke through the 
traditionally alleged apathy of the 
poor and created an almost universal 
desire to act. The Puerto Rican poor 
were able to overcome the shame 
bred by a society which blamed them 
for their plight; they were able to 
break the bonds of conformity 
enforced by their jobs and by every 
strand of institutional life; they were 
able to overcome the fears induced 
by the city’s police force.
Of course not all Puerto Ricans 
took up the banner of militancy. 
Indeed, many, perhaps even the 
majority were frightened at the turn 
of events. Yet there is little doubt that 
sympathy for the sentiment underly­
ing the “new militancy” touched all 
Puerto Ricans in the city. One of theClub-weilding policeman round up on West Division Street during second 
night of violence. June 14, 1966,
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m ore valuable group a sse ts  to 
em erge from the 1966 riot was an 
“awakening” among the m asses of 
the Puerto Rican poor. This awaken­
ing led to an increased ethnic con­
sciousness among Puerto Ricans: 
the partisan behavior and sense of 
group obligation that more and more 
Puerto Ricans began to exhibit in 
trying to overcome their conditions. 
Advocacy for Puerto Rican ethnic 
consciousness began to show up in 
various forms.
In  add ition  to several peace ral­lies held at Humbolt Park, commu­nity  lead e rs  o rganized  several major meetings during and after the 
riot to inform and interpret issues 
with residen ts  of the community. 
T he Latin A m erican Boys Club, 
located on 1218 N. Washtenaw Street 
in the heart of the Division Street 
Area, becam e the leading site for 
these gatherings. At times, Puerto 
Rican leaders met there with police 
officials and human relations staff 
workers to devise ways to prevent 
future disturbances (Chicago Daily 
News, June 13,1966). Several march­
es and dem onstrations w ere also 
organized. On June 28, over 200 
P u e rto  Rican re s id e n ts  of the  
Division Street Area m arched five 
miles to City Hall to pro test what 
they had come to interpret as police 
brutality and the failure of the city 
administration to recognize “Puerto 
Rican problems.” The Puerto Rican 
community also rallied to show sup­
port for those arrested  during the 
riot.
The Coordinating Commission of 
Puerto Rican Affairs was formed to 
help bail out those who had been 
imprisoned. Hundreds of barrio resi­
dents jammed into the courtroom  
where Puerto Ricans arrested during 
the riot were being tried. A Chicago 
Daily News’ story, “Judge’s Warning: 
R espect the  P o lice ,” ind ica ted  
that, conversing in Spanish, the spec­
ta to rs  provided  co n stan t m oral
encouragem ent to the defendants 
(June 13,1966).
...The post-riot period did witness 
a steady decline in the relative social 
status of some of the earlier Puerto 
Rican elite. Social standing and the 
legitimacy to speak on issues pertain­
ing to the Puerto Rican community 
began to shift to a leadership  not 
directly connected to Los Caballeros 
or community organizations of the 
early adjustment period.
The old establishm ent was also 
challenged by the increasing effec­
tiveness of an emerging leadership 
comprised of few members of the old 
guard who had broken ranks and a 
large num ber of young, articulate, 
and brash new leaders. The leader­
ship of the Puerto Rican community, 
no longer in the exclusive hands of 
first-generation Puerto Ricans, began 
to question the traditional goals of 
the programs led by the old guard. 
After 1966 the  new leadersh ip  of 
P u e rto  R icans increasing ly  gave 
voice to an ideology that challenged 
the assimilationist perspective of Los 
Caballeros and other early organiza­
tions. Like the old guard’s approach, 
the new leaders assum ed that the
grow ing w hite hostility  could be 
dealt with if Puerto Ricans developed 
and organized their own economic 
and civic institutions. On the other 
hand, this philosophy also called for 
counterattack; the new leadership 
em phasized p ro test against injus­
tices. It began to mount broad and 
all-embracing attacks upon the forces 
of oppression of the larger American 
society. The lines between the two 
ideological camps were not always 
clearly drawn. At times, the issues 
were spelled out; at other times, they 
were only implicit. But regardless of 
the many variations and complexi­
ties , C hicago’s em erg ing  P uerto  
Rican leaders were engaged in a new 
and different approach directly relat­
ed to the  course  of P uerto  Rican 
development in the city.
The Young Lords represent one of 
the  various activist, d irect action, 
organizational efforts among Puerto 
R icans in C hicago from  the  mid- 
1960s onward. D espite the  Young 
Lords’ political activism and a gener­
al increase of civic activities among 
barrio  residen ts, in the main, the 
people of the Division S treet Area 
were not in a position to establish 
action-oriented community institu­
Persons involved in violent street fighting a t Division. Witnesses and lawyers 
appear in North Boys Court. June 16, 1966
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Courtesy: Chicago Sun-TImes
tions and organizations that would 
adequately meet the needs of the 
growing Puerto Rican community. 
Most Puerto Rican businesses were 
undercapitalized and the existing 
cultural and social service organiza­
tions and agencies lacked the finan­
cial resources to develop satisfactory 
facilities and to hire adequate profes­
sional staffs to deal with the many 
problems operative in el barrio. It 
was the indirect result of the expan­
sion into the Division Street Area of 
“Community Action Programs” 
(CAP), established throughout the 
country during the early 1960s as 
part of the federal government’s War 
Against Poverty, which contributed 
to the development of some of these 
structures as well as toward the 
growth of a new leadership.
The outburst of racial violence on Division Street during the summer of 1966 produced a 
political response from city officials 
in the form of community action pro­
grams to address the complex social 
problems of el barrio. In turn, these 
programs were used to produce a 
politicized and activist agenda by
some Puerto Ricans. Federally fund­
ed Community Action Programs, 
channeled through the city’s political 
system, then, became the leading 
mechanism for the institutionaliza­
tion of barrio-based politics or 
activist social action. Several of the 
Community Action Programs estab­
lished in the Division Street Area 
during this period were transformed 
from community service agencies 
into local political structures; they 
were used to politicize inactive bar­
rio residents, i.e., welfare mothers, 
g an g s, unem ployed , schoo l 
dropouts, and the like.
...The most important CAP estab­
lished by the city public officials and 
used by some Puerto Ricans to politi­
cize area residents was an urban 
progress center. The Division Street 
Urban Progress Center, put into 
place immediately following the riot
on Division Street, represented the 
first program of this kind to service 
any of the city’s Spanish-speaking 
populations. It began as an outpost of 
the Garfield Park Community Center, 
but shortly thereafter became a ser­
vice agency of its own. The initial 
location, 2120 W. Division Street, was 
near the spot where the civil distur­
bances had occurred a month earlier. 
Like other urban progress centers in 
the city, the neighborhood center 
was a multi-service program estab­
lished to coordinate the activities of 
governmental and, at times, private 
agencies servicing the Division 
Street Area. Further, a series of Title
II Community Action Program agen­
cies, as well as others funded outside 
this title, were housed in the Center.
Many other programs from the 
arsenal of weapons used in the pover­
ty war were also established through­
out the Division Street community 
and housed in the Center. To close 
the gap between barrio residents and 
the nonpoor, manpower training— 
both institutional and on-the-job— 
was required. Hence, the Job Corps, 
the Neighborhood Youth Corps 
(NYC), the Manpower Development 
and Training ACT (MDTA), JOBS, 
and Work Incentive Programs (WIN) 
were either established or scheduled 
for rapid expansion into this commu­
nity during and after the summer 
of 1966. Head Start, Teacher Corps, 
and Title I of the Aid to Education 
Act were also launched to assist the 
children of that generation in prepar­
ing for school and in receiving better 
and more schooling. Further, a 
Neighborhood Health Center was set 
into place to subsidize the medical 
expenses of welfare recipients and 
the medically indigent.
In short, the Division Street 
Urban Progress Center was a 
catchall for projects to aid the poor— 
practically any effort aimed at reduc­
ing poverty could be found as part of 
the structural arrangement of the 
Center. Given this range, it was clear 
that the Center was not a program, 
but a strategy for combating poverty. 
When one examines the literature on 
the War on Poverty, it becomes very 
obvious that one of the prime goals 
was to give the lower classes, and 
particularly the ethnic minorities, a 
middle-class mentality rather than 
middle-class resources. Daniel P. 
Moynihan makes it clear in his 
report, The Negro Family: The Case 
for National Action (1965), that, in 
his view, the deterioration of the 
black family is at the root of their 
problems. In the 1960s, thousands of 
pages were devoted to the “culture of 
poverty” and how to break the “cycle 
of poverty.” The argument ran: peo­
ple can make their way out of poverty 
through changes in attitude, motiva­
tion, and willingness to make sacri­
fices. The policy, aimed more at 
changing the attitudes of mind than 
at offering material help, was a psy­
chological assault to give the poor 
the motivation to work their own way 
out of poverty. As Charles Valentine 
(1968) has so ably shown, this was
Puerto Ricans began vowing to fight to 
change their conditions and their way to power. 
There was a difference in both the tone and the 
tempo of their protest: the tone was bitter 
and the tempo was frenetic.
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The goal of the Division Street Urban Progress 
Center was to teach "malajusted individuals" 
how to adapt themselves to society as it was, 
rather than to change those aspects of society 
that made the individuals what they were.
only a subtle way of blaming poverty 
on the poor.
The approach followed by social 
service agencies and social workers 
concentrated far too much on symp­
toms rather than on causes—and on 
symptoms seen and treated individu­
ally rather than in connection with 
other symptoms. This concern with 
symptoms has been a reflection of 
the preoccupation of the social work 
profession with case work and the 
study and treatment of individual 
maladjustment. The goal of the 
Division Street Urban Progress 
Center was to teach “maladjusted 
individuals” how to adapt themselves 
to society as it was, rather than to 
change those aspects of society that 
made the individuals what they were. 
In some instances, the services 
offered at the Center would simply 
substitute a new set of symptoms for 
the old.
It’s little wonder that a larger 
number of social scientists as well as 
local residents of poor communities 
throughout the country acquired a 
growing sense of disenchantment 
with the War on Poverty programs. 
An abundance of evidence is found 
that speaks to the limited impact 
these programs had on poor people. 
After reviewing governmental 
actions in post-1967 in such impor­
tant areas as poverty, education, and 
housing, an Urban America and 
Urban Coalition report entitled, 
“One Year Later,” concluded that 
“most actions and programs to meet 
ghetto problems and grievances had 
been, depending on the area, too lim­
ited, under funded, or nonexistent” 
(1969:114-118). The Division Street 
Urban Progress Center represents a 
sample case of a policy which 
offered individualistic solutions to 
members of this aggrieved Spanish­
speaking population, as opposed to 
structural solutions. Although 
Community Action Programs in gen­
eral reinforced the status quo by 
coopting people into pseudo-conflicts
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rather than engaging their members 
in effective struggles, it was primari­
ly the establishment of the Division 
Street Urban Progress Center which 
provided the impetus for political 
activism among barrio residents. 
Two separate dimensions of the 
Center facilitated this: (1) the 
employment of community residents 
as part of its staff and (2) participation 
in its advisory council by local commu­
nity residents. More specifically, sever­
al staff and advisory council members 
of the Division Street Urban Progress 
Center used their position and status 
to politicize community residents on 
behalf of their interests.
...ADVISORY COUNCIL ACTIVISM
One of the major organizations to emerge on the crest of the Puerto Rican riot of 1966 was 
the Spanish Action Committee of 
Chicago (SACC). Several Puerto 
Rican leaders tried to seize the oppor­
tunity presented by the rise of unrest 
in the Division Street Area to build a 
“formal organization” in the sure con­
viction that this was the order of the 
day. The disruptive protests which 
had characterized the Puerto Rican 
struggle during the summer of 1966 
were quickly superseded by an 
emphasis on the need for “communi­
ty organization,” and SACC was one 
expression of that change. Its leaders 
and organizers, while animated by 
the spirit of protest, were neverthe­
less more deeply committed to the
goal of building a mass-based perma­
nent organization among barrio resi­
dents. Several similar efforts were 
followed in the 1970s but none 
gained the city-wide scope of SACC.
The Spanish Action Committee 
of Chicago was formed in June, 
1966, “to enable local residents to 
identify in an organized manner the 
physical and social problems of the 
community, to in te rp re t these 
needs to city agencies, and work 
toward implementing some com­
munity-based program s” (A 
Proposal to Develop an Urban 
Service Training Center, submitted 
by the Spanish Action Committee 
of Chicago, not dated). During its 
early period, only a cadre of volun­
teers constituted the membership 
of SACC. Mr. Juan Diaz, a former 
member of Los Caballeros, was its 
Executive Director, and there was 
a board of directors composed of 
local residents. But because of the 
tem per of the times, th is non­
salaried hard core managed to 
bring out ever-increasing numbers 
of supporters for organizational 
activities. During this early stage, 
leaders of SACC concentrated on 
direct action, and the actions they 
led in the streets were generally 
more militant and disruptive than 
those of Los Caballeros and of ear­
lier groups. They seized upon 
every grievance as an opportunity 
for inciting mass actions, and chan­
neled their energy into extensive 
pam phleteering and agitation, 
which helped bring community res­
idents together and raise the pitch 
of anger to defiance. SACC orga­
nized boycotts, picket lines, and 
demonstrations to attack discrimi­
nation in access to a wide range of 
services. A summary report, pre­
pared by SACC, indicates the more 
notable involvement of the organi­
zation during the period of 1967- 
1969:
1. Relocation of Division 
Street Urban Progress Center 
to its present location from
a store front.
SACC received complaints from 
local residents pertaining to the limi­
tations and service problems of the 
then storefront Urban Progress 
Center unit. SACC took action by 
informing Dr. Dayton Brooks, 
Director of Chicago Committee on 
Urban Opportunities, that unless 
something was done about these 
problems, direct action would be 
taken on the part of the community. 
Dr. Brooks came and personally 
inspected the facilities and ordered 
that the present location, 1940 W. 
Division St., was more suitable for 
the Center.
2. Creation of the Humboldt 
Park Recreation Committee.
In collaboration with more than 
twenty Puerto Rican community 
organizations and local residents, a 
series of meetings and pickets were 
organized against the Chicago Park 
District. Our demands called for the 
building of a large size swimming 
pool and improvement of Humboldt 
Park facilities and programs. Some 
improvements were made, however, 
the park district did not meet our 
demands of a new and large swim­
ming pool.
3. Removal of Policemen 
from the 13th District.
SACC received various complaints 
about certain police officers who 
were using unlawful tactics and dis­
criminatory actions against the 
Puerto Rican community. SACC's 
legal committee circulated a petition, 
gathering over 2,000 signatures. The 
petition was taken to the Internal 
Investigation Division of the Chicago 
Police Department, and after much 
examination several of these officers 
were removed from this district.
4. Board of Education’s 
Program is Defeated by 
Community Parents.
After learning of a proposed 
boundary change and the potentially 
subsequent transfer of 300 students 
from Von Humboldt School, SACC 
arranged that the board's agency in 
charge of these changes meet with 
the Puerto Rican community. A pub­
lic meeting was arranged and held at 
the school, the parents opposed all 
proposed changes. New boundaries 
for Von Humboldt School were never 
drawn.
SACC gained a wide and approv­
ing audience by articulating feelings 
which most Puerto Ricans shared but 
feared to voice in public. The success 
of SACC in mobilizing the barrio 
poor and receiving support from 
other emerging community groups 
and organizations resulted, principal­
ly, from its close affiliation with the 
Division Street Urban Progress 
Center—several members of SACC 
were also members of the Center's 
Advisory Council. This Council, com­
prised of members from local busi­
nesses and community service agen­
cies, had a formal advisory role in 
program planning within the Division 
Street Area. From the beginning, 
members of SACC were represented 
in the Advisory Council's member­
ship. There were times when one 
SACC representative was a member 
of the council; at other times, two 
SACC members served as part of the 
council's membership base.
Participation in the Center's 
Advisory Council provided these 
members with an excellent opportu­
nity to learn a variety of political 
skills. They learned about the inter­
nal workings of this particular social 
service agency, the interrelationship 
between this agency and different 
levels of government, where to go to 
get things done, and the problems of 
funding and program support. Just as 
important, participation in the 
Center’s Advisory Council kept mem­
bers of SACC always informed of par­
ticular policies, programs, issues, and 
decisions concerning the Puerto 
Rican community. Members of SACC 
and other community representa­
tives, serving on the Advisory 
Council, operated consistently as a 
voting block on contested issues and 
were able to win on key issues 
against the opposition of other board 
members. A coalition was also orga­
nized by SACC members to support 
common demands on internal issues 
within the Center involving budget 
cut-backs, program choices, and per­
sonnel appointments.
When an issue of great signifi­
cance to the Puerto Rican communi­
ty could not be resolved or treated by 
the Advisory Council, the SACC 
members would turn to their own 
organization for a solution. The coali­
tion established by the leaders of 
SACC and community representa­
tives did become engaged directly in 
controversies involving other com­
munity service agencies.
The essence of the new militancy 
among Puerto Ricans was the basis 
for the formation of institutions and 
structures that could implement 
organized actions and concerted and 
coordinated programs to aid in the 
ascent up the ladder. Those who sup­
ported the new structures believed 
that the ethnicity that already existed 
among Puerto Ricans only needed to 
be strengthened to become a factor 
to be reckoned with.
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THE REPRESSION OF PROTEST
While dramatizing both the com­
plex problems confronting Puerto 
Rican residents of the city and the 
urgent need for solutions to the 
problems, the 1966 riot also marked 
the beginning of a new wave of 
Puerto Rican protest, one which is 
still underway today. The Division 
Street Riot put direct action on the 
agenda of social change in the 
Puerto Rican community. It made 
Puerto Ricans realize that protest 
could be used as an effective power 
tool, stretching its influence into the 
political process. However, as quick­
ly as protest was introduced into the 
Puerto Rican agenda, city officials 
moved in to repress it.
The grudging support that had 
been forthcoming to the Puerto 
Rican community in the post-riot 
years in the form of Community 
Action Programs was now joined by 
an increasingly repressive local 
response to activism in the Division 
Street Area. The emergence of a mil­
itant leadership represented a direct 
threat to the established order, and 
therefore, had to be suppressed by 
any means the authorities thought 
necessary. There were countless
instances of intimidation, harass­
ment, and surveillance directed at 
the Puerto Rican groups and individ­
uals who were viewed as presenting 
a fundamental challenge to existing 
power relationships.
Typical of the wide ranging treat­
ment accorded black and other 
activist groups in the late sixties and 
early seventies by the CIA, the FBI, 
the Defense Department, and local 
police departments throughout the 
country, the “policing of politics” 
expanded considerably into the 
Division Street Area following the 
aftermath of the 1966 riot as police 
intelligence units moved to gather 
information on activists and potential 
activists. Personal files were main­
tained on a large number of barrio 
residents. Equally revealing is the 
range of individuals who were sur­
veilled either as primary targets or 
because of their alleged political 
activism. Any individual who attend­
ed a meeting in the community was 
listed as an activist or sympathizer. 
Even individuals who were consid­
ered only remotely subversive or 
whose personal and political activities 
were irrelevant to any legitimate gov­
ernmental interests became targets
of surveillance. A vivid illustration of 
the reasons for surveilling persons 
involved in community activities in 
the Puerto Rican barrio comes from 
the files of Obed López. Although 
Obed López is Mexican, he was ini­
tially classified as a Puerto Rican; and 
his personal life was the subject of a 
ten-day intensive surveillance by two 
intelligence agents. Their report for a 
sample day, records his going and 
comings, car and license number, 
when he parked his car and where, 
etc.:
SUBJECT (Obed López) drives a 
dark green Volkswagen, 11. Lic. # 
HK 5026 which he usually parks on 
the 1200-1300 blocks of California, 
the 2800 block of Division, or the 
1200 block of Washtenaw while in 
the Division Street area.
SUBJECT (Obed López) is very 
difficult to keep under surveillance 
as he is very evasive. He will drive 
in circles, stop on occasion for peri­
ods ranging from 3-4 minutes, leave 
his auto and walk up a block on one 
side, and return on the other side to 
a point near his auto where he 
watches for anyone who might be 
following him, and just about any 
other tactic that might throw off a 
surveillance, moving or stationary. 
(Police Report, August 23, 1966).
The politics of Obed López were 
analyzed by secret service agents in 
this way:
Obed López is presently heading 
up a Communist front organization 
known as the Latin American 
Defense Committee... (Police Report, 
September 19,1966). SUBJECT 
(Latin American Defense 
Organization), under the direction 
of Obed López, is currently conduct­
ing a boycott of the National Food 
Stores at 2650 & 2311 W. Division 
Street, and has picketed both stores 
on three occasions in groups of three. 
The purpose of the boycott and picket­
ing is to protest what they consider
Richard Daley (circa 1970) participating in the Puerto Rican Parade 
down State Street
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discriminatory hiring and personnel 
practices by the National TEA 
Company in relation to people of 
Latin American extraction. In gen­
eral, SUBJECT is using the 
National TEA Company as a scape­
goat for a “Pilot Program” they 
believe will give them considerable 
influence in the community, espe­
cially among the small businessmen 
who they feel will support them as 
they are supposedly encouraging 
Latins to buy from Latin owned busi­
nessmen or businesses. (Police 
Report, September 28 , 1966).
Subversive files were also main­
tained on Puerto Rican community 
organizations and groups composed
of individuals exercising their rights 
of association and political protest. 
Groups like the Young Lords, Aspira, 
Inc. of Illinois, Organization for 
Latin Americans in Chicago, Latin 
American Defense Organization, 
Northwest Spanish Community 
Committee, Latin Boy’s Club, and 
others were investigated. The files of 
the Organization for Latin Americans 
(OLA) are illustrative. The organiza­
tion was involved in working with 
issues pertaining to housing, employ­
ment, and civil rights. Although its 
methods were entirely peaceful, it 
was accused in the intelligence 
reports of being communist and aim­
ing to become the official voice of 
Spanish-speaking people in Chicago
(Police Report, July 11,1966).
Perhaps the most celebrated sur­
veilled group was SACC. SACC was 
subjected to a wide range of official 
control efforts by a unit of the 
Chicago Police Departm ent’s 
Intelligence Division also referred to 
as the Subversive Unit, the Security 
Section, or the Red Squad. The 
Subversive Unit used police officers 
as infiltrators to spy on the activities 
of SACC and at times to try  to 
provoke organization members into 
foolish actions. There was an 
Intelligence Unit’s police officer by 
the name of Thomas Braham who 
posed as a Spanish-speaking police­
man; James Zorno was another 
surveillance agent who passed as a 
public relations person with exper­
tise in the preparation of press releas­
es. There were also four Spanish­
speaking police officers: Victor Vega, 
Andrew Rodriguez, Alfredo Perales, 
and Edwin Olivieri. SACC was 
deemed worthy of infiltration 
primarily because, in the views of 
the Chicago Police Department’s 
Intelligence Unit, its ranks were filled 
with communists and leftists. The 
role of the police agents was to 
encourage paranoia and internal dis­
sension and to damage the public 
image of SACC.
The agents’ entry into SACC was 
facilitated by the structure of the 
organization; it lacked resources and 
people willing to undertake the 
routine and time-consuming tasks 
required of activists. The agents 
brought badly needed skills and 
resources. It was assumed by SACC 
members that the agents’ ties to insti­
tutions they claimed to represent 
would give the organization added 
strength of support. The entry of 
these informants into SACC was fur­
ther facilitated by the fact that the 
organization was not comprised of a 
highly centralized, formally orga­
nized, tightly knit group of experi­
enced activists, but was instead 
decentralized, with fluid task
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assignments and an emphasis on 
participation. Members were gen­
erally not carefully screened, and 
requirements for membership were 
minimal. This was all the more true 
in cases of social action demonstra­
tions, meetings, and marches—in 
which anyone could participate. 
The emergent non-institutional­
ized, social movement character of 
the struggle, as advanced by 
SACC, meant constantly changing 
plans, shifting alliances, and spon­
taneous actions. SACC’s ideology 
stressed  peaceful nonviolent 
means, reform, democracy, open­
ness, an anti-bureaucratic orienta­
tion, optimistic faith in people, tol­
erance, community, and naivete 
about government surveillance. 
SACC had nothing to hide; the 
group saw little reason to be suspi­
cious. Several “investigator’s
rep o rts”, prepared for the 
Intelligence Division of the Chicago 
Police Department by undercover 
police officers and filed during the 
summer of 1966, reveal the direct 
and active part played by these offi­
cers in the ultimate dissolution of 
SACC. In one of the earliest reports 
the investigating officer indicates 
very explicitly that the objective of 
his undertaking “was to destroy the 
SUBJECT [Spanish Action 
Committee of Chicago], its leaders 
and community influence” (June, 
1966). In another report dated 
August 19, 1966, the reporting offi­
cer noted: “I launched an all out 
anti-Ted Vélez, anti-Juan Diaz cam­
paign amongst the original commit­
tee members of subject organiza­
tion, with emphasis on the subver­
sive intonations.”
If the repressive actions directed
at SACC were to be successful, the 
involvement of some of the organiza­
tion’s members were required in the 
plot. The undercover Red Squad offi­
cers used intimidation tactics to gain 
the support of a few organization 
members. The police officers con­
vinced these members that the orga­
nization’s involvement in communist- 
related activities would ultimately 
cause them a great deal of harm and 
pain. In particular, Ted and Myrta 
Ramirez were two SACC members 
identified by the infiltrators as 
prospective collaborators since, 
according to the police officers, both 
members were very dissatisfied with 
the way the organization was being 
run. One investigator’s report, which 
details the content of a meeting 
between one police officer and Mr. 
and Mrs. Ramirez, demonstrates the 
intimidating tactics used by the offi­





tance expressed by these two SACC 
members to the idea of aiding the 
police with the expulsion from the 
organization of its alleged commu­
nists and leftists:
[Police officer] then advised 
[Mrs. Ramirez] of the fact that 
communists are undisputed masters 
of deceit, and will seize on any pop­
ular or controversial issue for their 
own cause. [Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez] 
both seemed in agreement with this, 
but were slightly reluctant when the 
[police officer] said he would like 
their help in removing any commu­
nist influence from SACC. They feel 
that SACC has a lot of potential, 
and would never allow communists 
to take over, but would inform the 
[police officer] of the presence of 
any new or suspicious persons who 
might try to get into SACC. (August 
19,1966).
In an interview, Mr. Richard 
Gutman, the Attorney representing 
SACC, stated very clearly that those 
who defected from the organization 
were truly victims of the tactics used 
by the Red Squad. He pointed out, 
for instance, that the undercover 
police officer who passed as a 
Spanish-speaking policeman con­
vinced these members that SACC 
was a communist organization and 
that its leaders had been convicted of 
possession of narcotics. In the words 
of Mr. Gutman: Ted and Myrta were 
victims too. They were used. The 
various police reports make it clear 
that Ted and Myrta did not necessar­
ily want to quit SACC; this wasn't 
their idea. They were totally opposed 
to putting out the stuff about com­
munism.
In any event, after several meet­
ings, the police officers manipulated 
Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez into resigning 
from SACC and forming a competing 
organization. Shortly after the resig­
nation of these persons, the 
American Spanish Speaking Peoples 
Association (ASSPA) was born. In 
another investigator's report, the
role played by the surveillance offi­
cers in the formation of ASSPA is 
clearly stated:
The SUBJECT was secretly orga­
nized by members of the Intelligence 
Division and composed of former 
members of the Spanish Action 
Committee of Chicago. Although the 
members know nothing of the part 
played by the Intelligence Division, 
they have been directed to a point 
where they will publicly denounce 
SACC and its leader, Juan Diaz and 
his followers and associates for acts 
not to the best interest of 
the Spanish-speaking community, 
and for the Communist influence 
they believe exists there. (August 
31, 1966).
The undercover officers then pro­
ceeded, successfully, to convince 
members of the newly created orga­
nization to prepare a press release 
announcing the establishment of 
ASSPA. After examining the text of 
the original press release prepared 
by members of ASSPA, the police 
officer assigned to this investigation 
concluded that it was insufficient for 
the desired goals of the police 
department: They did prepare a 
press release that said very little as 
to what their reasons were for resign­
ing from SUBJECT organization, at 
which time I felt it necessary to ask 
for the assistance of a “friend of the 
family” by the name of “Dr. Baron”,
an expert in the preparation of 
Press releases,... [but] who is in 
actuality Officer James Zarnow 
(Investigator's Report, August 19, 
1966). The entire text of this release 
is printed below to provide insights 
into the course of direction former 
members of SACC were driven to 
follow:
We, the members of ASSPA are for 
the most part, former members of the 
Spanish Action Committee of 
Chicago, who have arrived at the 
realization that SACC does not rep­
resent the Puerto Rican community 
or any of the Spanish Speaking as a 
whole. It has done nothing more 
than keep the Spanish community 
apart from the society it should be 
becoming a part of
SACC is being led by a man who is 
directed by individuals in New York 
who know nothing about Chicago, 
and only want to maintain discon­
tent and anger among the Puerto 
Ricans who live in Chicago. It is 
influenced by some people who have 
Communist philosophies and who 
have been before the hearings of the 
House Committee on Un-American 
Activities and Fair Play for Cuban 
Investigations. When organized, our 
group was dedicated to helping the 
Latin American peoples in Chicago; 
we were staff members, but every 
time we suggested methods to help 
make citizens of the people of our
...the "policing of politics" expanded consider­
ably into the Division Street area following the 
aftermath of the 1966 riot as police intelligence 
units moved to gather information on activists 
and potential activists.
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community, we found ourselves pow­
erless. This was possible because the 
Director of SACC, Juan Diaz 
assumed dictatorial power over the 
organization. We have never been 
told where our financial aid came 
from; we were given no information 
regarding the amount of money the 
organization had; Diaz refused to 
keep records and made all decisions. 
To us, it appears that the only inter­
ests served by SACC were to the ben­
efit of Juan Diaz and others who do 
not serve the interest of our country. 
We have since learned that this man 
Diaz is a convicted narcotic offender 
and of all things, he is presently the 
director of the Latin American Boys 
Club; and to our knowledge has no 
qualification as such director.
True, we are Puerto Ricans, 
Mexicans, Cubans and South 
Americans, but here, we are all 
Americans first. We should not be 
trying to set ourselves apart, but 
becoming part of the society we live 
in. Your descendants were strangers 
to the ways of their new land and 
many of them were not at first 
accepted, but they and their chil­
dren eventually overcame this. They 
were assimilated into the society 
around them, as we and our chil­
dren are and will be. SACC does 
not want this to happen; they want 
the Latin to feel apart, keep them 
angry, keep reminding that they are 
apart and make them believe they 
are not treated the same as other 
citizens. This is not true. Despite 
those people who preach hate, tell
lies to incite us, we are progressing 
and are accepted more and more 
each day. We are learning these 
things and those of us who have 
learned are helping those who need 
help. We are not a minority group, 
we are a majority group, we are 
Americans.
The resignation of SACC mem­
bers and the subsequent establish­
ment of ASSPA was carefully and 
strategically staged by the undercov­
er agents. The agents persuaded Bob 
Weidrich of the Chicago Tribune to 
use the press release and responses 
gathered from an interview with Mr. 
and Mrs. Ramirez to expose SACC, 
Diaz and etc. (Investigator’s Report, 
August 31, 1966). (It turned out that 
the undercover agents supplied the 
Tribune correspondent with the 
questions to ask during this inter­
view. Also, one of the agents was pre­
sent during the interview to provide 
the correct answers to the questions 
in cases when the two respondents’ 
replies were not in line with the 
expected response.) In a two-part 
series, Weidrich reported almost 
exclusively on allegations regarding 
the involvement of communist indi­
viduals in SACC. He made the claim 
that one reputed Communist provid­
ed SACC with both financial and advi­
sory support. This particular individ­
ual was said to have been a former 
Fair Play for Cuba committee official. 
Further, the reports charged that 
SACC was being taken over by out­
siders: Puerto Ricans from New York 
who were also alleged as communist 
affiliated and a Californian alleged
to have been a former head of 
the Young Communist League of 
C alifornia (Chicago T ribune , 
September 3-4,1966).
The police officers also arranged 
for Alfredo Torres de Jesús, a writer 
for El Puertorriqueño, to use the 
Chicago Tribune information for a 
local publication. A week later, El 
Puertorriqueño’s front-page, lead 
story was almost a complete transla­
tion of Weidrich’s articles. However, 
Mr. Torres de Jesús sensationalized 
the story by calling it: “SACC 
ES NIDO DE COMUNISTAS”— 
SACC is a nest of Communists 
(El P uertorriqueño , Week of 
September 9-15,1966), contributing 
more severely to the damage and dis­
credit of the organization.
The press played an indispensable 
role in the planned disruption 
of SACC. The combined articles 
attracted a great deal of attention. 
The publicized charges that SACC 
was communist affiliated not only 
served to drive out some members 
(except for two, all other officers of 
the organization resigned their post), 
but also to scare off potential recruits 
and supporters. The charges made 
against SACC raised the cost and 
danger of being active in the organi­
zation, and supporters feared their 
careers would be ruined if they con­
tinued their affiliation. The testi­
monies of several of these supporters 
at a trial filed by SACC against the 
city of Chicago gives weight to this 
point:
Those articles had a very great 
negative effect on SACCs reputa­
tion in the Puerto Rican communi­
ty. Because of those articles, SACC 
gained a reputation for being con­
trolled or influenced by communists. 
This reputation greatly decreased 
the Puerto Rican community s will­
ingness to work with SACC. I  quit 
SACC when I  read in the newspa­
per that the organization was taken 
over by communists...
There was a lot of conversation 
about [the newspaper] articles.
The undercover Red Squad officers used 
intimidation tactics to gain the support 
of a few organization members.
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Americans, but here, 
we are all Americans 
first. We should not 
be trying to set 
ourselves apart, 
but becoming part 
of the society we 
live in."
-P re s s  release announcing ASSPA
People were very negative. They 
thought the information was real, 
and then nobody wanted to be asso­
ciated with the Communist Party. I  
did not want to be associated with 
the organization, I  stopped going to 
meetings. I  did not want to be 
known as a communist.
There is little doubt that political 
repression, as manifested in surveil­
lance and disruption activities, signif­
icantly disrupted and discredited 
SACC and thereby made the organi­
zation less attractive to members and 
sympathizers. A present-day mem­
ber of SACC informed me in an inter­
view: “We were set back an entire 
generation. The Chicago Police 
Department hampered our growth. 
We had a very good reputation in the 
community before the smears in the 
Tribune and El Puertoriqueno.” 
Similarly, Richard Gutman said: “The 
evidence clearly shows that SACC 
was the major group in the Puerto 
Rican community during the sum­
mer of 1966. But after the press pub­
lication, it never recovered its former 
position. It continued to function, 
it remained active, but it never 
regained its early form.”
In addition, increased police 
repression significantly deterred 
some people form speaking out, 
demonstrating, or joining protest 
groups, and thereby weakened the 
capacity for political activism in the 
Division Street Area. Government 
and police officials demonstrated 
that open defiance by Puerto Ricans 
was extremely dangerous and often 
suicidal. Despite this, there is much 
evidence to suggest that political 
repression did not significantly deter 
protest activities in el barrio. Protest 
increased even as political repres­
sion increased, at least until 1975. 
Regardless of the various official 
repressive actions taken against 
members of barrio-based political 
activist organizations and groups, 
the organizer and mass-agitator
types of leaders continued to repre­
sent a very important part of 
Chicago’s Puerto Rican community.
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